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    ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I take a closer look at the controversy between cosmopolitans and the advocates 
of a political conception of justice. I will defend a political conception of justice, though I 
suggest some revisions. A cosmopolitan approach is often connected with monism, i.e., the 
claim that the same sort of normative principles should apply to institutions and to individual 
choices. A political conception of justice presupposes dualism, namely a separation between 
the principles of justice guiding the design of institutions and the moral principles applying to 
individual  choices.  In  section  2  of  the  paper  I  discuss  Thomas  Pogge’s  cosmopolitan  position  
and try to show that Pogge shifts from a dualistic account of justice to a monistic account 
when it comes to the  problem  of  world  poverty;;  therefore  Pogge’s  treatment  of  world  poverty  
is vulnerable to the objections which he himself raised against monism. Moreover, in section 
3,  I  argue  that  Pogge’s  exclusive  focus  on  negative  duties  is  implausible  and  creates  
excessively heavy burdens on the side of better-off individuals. In section 4 I argue that there 
is no need to consider the nation-state as a hindrance to the realization of a more global 
justice. I end with some suggestions as to how a political conception of justice can be 
modified to meet some of the criticisms cosmopolitans have rightly raised.   
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The current debate between cosmopolitans and the defenders of a so-called political 
conception of justice2 focuses mainly on two questions: first, what is the site and scope of 
justice; and second, whether problems such as drastic world-wide economic inequalities and 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Thomas Nagel, Richard Pildes, Thomas Pogge, Joan Tronto, and David Velleman for 
critical comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank the  participants  of  the  conference  on  “Justice,  
Legitimacy,  and  Public  International  Law”  at  the  University of Bern in December 2006 for critical discussion. 
2 For a cosmopolitan position see Th. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Second edition (Cambridge GB: 
Polity  Press,  2008).  (All  further  references  are  to  the  second  edition  of  Pogge’s  book);;  Ch.  R.  Beitz,  
‘Cosmopolitanism  and  Global  Justice’,  The Journal of Ethics 9, 2005, 11-27. A political conception of justice 
(following  Rawls)  is  taken  e.g.  by  Th.  Nagel  and  M.  Risse.  See  Th.  Nagel,  ‘The  Problem  of  Global  Justice’,  
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 2 (2005), 113-47;;  M.  Risse,  ‘How  Does  the  Global  Order  Harm  the  Poor’,  
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 4 (2005), 349-376.  
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vast differences in life chances between the members of wealthy and poor countries can be 
tackled only by transcending the traditional nation-state order. 
 
Cosmopolitans argue that issues like world poverty and severe unfairness of social 
opportunities amount to problems of justice, moreover global justice, since their moral 
relevance transcends ethnic as well as state borders. The claim of cosmopolitans concerns the 
site as well as the scope of justice. World poverty and severe social and economic inequalities 
are global problems since they cannot be explained and understood apart from the current 
system of international economic relations and agreements (regulating access to markets, 
market subsidies, trade barriers, flow of capital, currency exchange conditions, 
creditworthiness). These agreements and regulations, enacted and controlled by powerful 
global institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the WTO, do 
have, cosmopolitans point out, substantial effects on the life prospects and economic 
opportunities of individuals. The strong impact of these international organizations on the 
social and economic conditions of persons allows us therefore to assume the existence of a 
global basic structure. 
 
In addition to this empirical thesis about the global site of justice, cosmopolitans adopt a 
normative premise concerning the scope of justice. Since problems like poverty and inequality 
are mainly due to the currently unjust global economic order, they create strong moral 
obligations and duties of justice on the side of those better-off who eventually profit from the 
unfair status quo. 
 
Cosmopolitans are also critical of the nation-state system. Since nation-states display strong 
partiality towards the interests of their members (for example, by enacting restrictions on 
immigration, residence, citizenship, and entrance to labour markets), they present an obstacle 
to the achievement of global justice. An additional reason why cosmopolitans think that issues 
of justice should be addressed independently of the nation-state perspective is this: If nation-
states were the parties to a global contract or agreement on principles of justice, then intrastate 
discrimination against particular individuals or specific ethnic or social groups who live under 
unjust and unfavourable conditions would not become visible.3 Therefore individuals, not 
institutions like the nation-state or political unions like peoples, should be the moral units of 
                                                          
3 A.  Buchanan  objects  that  Rawls’s  conception,  as  Rawls  develops  it  in  the  Law of Peoples, does not allow to 
deal with issues of intrastate conflict and ethnic autonomy aspirations due to unfair intrastate conditions. See A. 
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theories of global justice. What  is  relevant  is  the  way  individuals’  basic  rights  are  respected  or  
violated and their autonomy for leading a decent and worthwhile life is enhanced or thwarted.  
 
Defenders of a political conception of justice claim that justice applies to the basic structure of 
a particular society (nation-state), and, moreover, that duties of justice in a strict sense hold 
merely between the members of a particular society (nation-state). We do have obligations to 
severely poor and marginalized people outside our nation-state; these obligations, however, 
are of a humanitarian kind and not duties of justice in a strict sense. Duties of justice are 
associative obligations, obligations owed to those with whom we have political relations 
within a state order. Defenders of a  political  conception  of  justice  basically  follow  Rawls’s  
position as he outlined it in the Law of Peoples:  peoples  do  have  a  duty  to  assist  “other  
peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political social regime”.4 However, there are no duties of justice created by an application of a 
cosmopolitan  or  global  principle  of  distributive  justice.  Rawls’s  justification  for  rejecting  
distributive responsibilities on the global level are as follows. First of all, global inequalities 
are mainly due to the internal political organisation of a society and its social and cultural 
traditions; and second, there might be no cut-off point in transfers of wealth and income from 
better-off to worse-off societies which might create unjust burdens on the side of better-off 
societies.5 Recently, defenders of a political conception of justice have added a further 
argument why humanitarian duties of assistance, but not strict duties of justice, hold on the 
global level: The realization of actual justice demands coercion by the state; since such a 
global coercive sovereign power does not exist, the idea of global justice in a strict sense 
cannot be defended.6  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Buchanan,  ‘Rawls’s  Law  of  Peoples:  Rules  of  a  Vanished  Westphalian  World’,  Ethics 110, 4 (2000), 697-721, 
here: 716-720.  
4 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 37. Rawls uses the term 
‘peoples’ to indicate his distance to the traditional conception of sovereign states (as determined by rational self-
interest and having the right to go to war) and to stress that his central aim in the Law of Peoples is to construct a 
political morality for international relations. Buchanan objects that Rawls would have been clearer if he had used 
the  term  ‘peoples  organized  in  states’.  Buchanan,  ‘Rawls’s  Law  of  Peoples:  Rules  of  a  Vanished  Westphalian  
World’,  699.   
5 One might say that Rawls applies the principle of luck egalitarianism (individuals only deserve compensation 
for brute bad luck, not option luck) to the case of societies. He offers the following example: Two societies, A 
and B, start with an equal level of wealth but choose different policies: the first society opts for investment, 
industrialization, and a high rate of saving; the second society chooses none of these policies with the result that 
some decades later the first society would be much wealthier than the second society. A global distribution 
principle (along the line of a cosmopolitan difference principle) would require that transfers are made from A to 
B; Rawls thinks this to be unjustified. See Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 117.   
6 For  such  a  position  see  Nagel,  ‘The  Problem  of  Global  Justice’. 
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In the current literature, political conceptions of justice have been sharply criticized. A main 
objection is that advocates of political conceptions of justice are stuck in a historically 
outdated  framework  of  a  “vanished  Westphalian  World”  and  have  missed  recent  global  
developments.7 Moreover, the distinction they draw between duties of justice and duties of 
assistance amounts to a scandalous ignorance towards the moral weight of grave inequalities 
in the social global order: poverty can, and does, entail the loss of life. Equally, the 
connection between justice and coercion has been rejected.8  
 
In this paper I take a closer look at the controversy between cosmopolitans and the advocates 
of a political conception of justice. I will defend a political conception of justice, though I 
suggest some revisions. A cosmopolitan approach is often connected with monism, i.e., the 
claim that the same sort of normative principles should apply to institutions and to individual 
choices. A political conception of justice presupposes dualism, namely a separation between 
the principles of justice guiding the design of institutions and the moral principles applying to 
individual  choices.  In  section  2  of  the  paper  I  discuss  Thomas  Pogge’s  cosmopolitan  position  
and try to show that Pogge shifts from a dualistic account of justice to a monistic account 
when  it  comes  to  the  problem  of  world  poverty;;  therefore  Pogge’s  treatment  of  world  poverty  
is vulnerable to the objections which he himself raised against monism. Moreover, in section 
3,  I  argue  that  Pogge’s  exclusive  focus  on  negative  duties  is  implausible  and  creates  
excessively heavy burdens on the side of better-off individuals. In section 4 I argue that there 
is no need to consider the nation-state as a hindrance to the realization of a more global 
justice. I end with some suggestions as to how a political conception of justice can be 
modified to meet some of the criticisms cosmopolitans have rightly raised.   
 
2.  MONISM, DUALISM, AND WORLD POVERTY   
 
Even if we consider the basic structure as the primary object of justice, it is still controversial 
whether we should also accept the strict distinction some theorists of justice, for example 
Rawls, draw between those normative standards which ought to guide the design of 
institutions and those standards that are meant to regulate individual practices and actions. 
Some philosophers have argued that a thorough concern with issues of justice requires us to 
apply the same sort of principles to institutional design and to individual attitudes and 
                                                          
7 See  Buchanan,  ‘Rawls’s  Law  of  Peoples:  Rules  of a  Vanished  Westphalian  World’;;  A.J.  Julius,  ‘Nagel’s  
Atlas’,  Philosophy and Public Affairs 34,2, 2006, 176-192. 
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choices.9. A problematic consequence of that strategy is that requirements of justice addressed 
to institutions are translated into very demanding individual moral obligations.  
 
A paradigm case motivating such a transfer of normative obligations from public or political 
morality to individual morality is the problem of world poverty.10 World poverty is 
considered by many moral philosophers as the most pressing moral issue at present. The 
dramatic differences in the living standard and levels of well-being are striking.11 The urgency 
of the problem is certainly intensified by the fact that one small part of the world population is 
not only well off, but exceptionally better off than a large group of other people. The facts are 
so grave and depressing that many philosophers consider the policy of delegating the problem 
to a reform of current institutions or a set-up of new institutions to be morally intolerable. In 
their view more efficient and immediate relief seems necessary. It often seems to make more 
sense to care directly for the well-being of others than to delegate the problem to the 
normative construction of institutions, as Liam Murphy points out:  
 
 But it could not be right that an individual, rich First Worlder is required to devote 
 her resources to the Quixotic task of promoting just international institutions. Such a 
 person could clearly do so much more to alleviate suffering or inequality by doing 
 what she can on her own – by giving money to humanitarian aid agencies.12  
 
Consequently, many have sympathized with an account that puts remarkable weight on the 
moral duties of individuals. It is quite common among cosmopolitans to hold that 
requirements of global justice have to be discharged to a remarkable extent by individuals. 
 
Does the urgency of a problem like world poverty suggest that we should give up the 
separation between the principles guiding our promotion of just institutions and those guiding 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 See  A.  Abizadeh,  ‘Cooperation,  Pervasive  Impact,  and  Coercion:  On  the  Scope  (not Site) of Distributive 
Justice’,  Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35, 4, 2007, 308-58, esp. 352, 321. 
9 A  prominent  example  is  G.A.  Cohen.  See  G.  A.  Cohen,  ‘Where  the  Action  Is:  On  the  Site  of  Distributive  
Justice’,  Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, 1 (1997), 3-30. 
10 By  ‘individual  morality’  I  mean  those  principles  and  norms  that  apply  to  our  personal  actions  and  attitudes;;  the  
terms  ‘public  morality’  and  ‘political  morality’  refer  to  the  norms  and  principles  of  justice  that  determine  the  
basic structure of society. 
11 Thomas Pogge cites the following numbers: “(I)t  is  estimated  that  830  million  human  beings  are  chronically  
undernourished, 1,100 million lack acces to safe water, 2, 600 million lack access to basic sanitation, 1,000 
million lack adequate shelter, and 1, 600 lack electricity. About 2,000 million lack accesss to essential drugs, 
some  774  million  adults  are  illiterate,  and  there  are  218  million  child  laborers.”  See  Thomas  W.  Pogge,  World 
Poverty and Human Rights, 2. 
12 L.  B.  Murphy,  ‘Institutions  and  the  Demands  of  Justice’,  Philosophyand  Public Affairs 27, 4 (1998), 251-91: 
here 281.  
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our personal choices? A closer look at the distinction between monism and dualism helps to 
clarify the question  
 
Monism holds that those normative principles that guide the sphere of public morality equally 
ought to guide our personal choices and ways of acting. In the version put forth by G.A. 
Cohen, monism amounts to a modification  of  Rawls’s  theory  of  justice:  the  principles  of  
justice that guide our design of institutions should equally apply to the set of informal 
practices that determine and structure our personal relations to others. Within the basic 
structure of society, so the argument goes, there is room for informal discriminatory practices 
that sum up to severe injustices. A theory of justice must also reflect these patterns of 
informal  discrimination  that  are  expressions  of  personal  attitudes.  According  to  Cohen’s  
account, not only institutions but also the attitudes of persons belong to the realm of justice. 
Cohen argues that monism allows us, for example, to consider the harmful consequences of 
sexist or racist attitudes as questions of justice.13 Social justice, as he emphasizes, cannot be 
gained merely by creating just institutions; it also requires a social ethos which is created if 
individuals apply the principles of justice to their personal conduct and attitudes.14 So the 
difference principle should also guide the attitudes and choices of individual persons:  
 
It is generally thought that the difference principle would be used by government to 
modify the effect of choices which are not themselves influenced by the principle,  
but, so I claim, in a society of wholehearted commitment to the principle, there cannot 
            be so stark a contrast between public and private choice. Instead, citizens want their 
            own economic behaviour to satisfy the principle and they help to sustain a moral 
            climate in which others want the same.15 
 
Dualism maintains a strong distinction between the spheres of individual morality and public 
morality.  The  paradigmatic  example  of  a  dualist  account  is  Rawls’s  theory  of  justice.  Rawls’s  
principles of justice, i.e., the principle of equal freedom, the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, and the difference principle, apply to the normative structure of institutions but 
                                                          
13 The case of gender-injustice in the family despite appropriate family legislation has been one issue that 
motivated  Cohen’s  defence  of  monism.   
14 Cohen is aware of the limits of legal regulations in fighting problems of discrimination. Therefore, he 
emphasizes the impact of justice-based ethical conventions and practices that bind us and form our attitudes 
(social ethos). The regulative effect of these conventions and practices should ideally be as powerful as legal 
regulations. Cohen does not want persons whose social practices do not conform to the principles of justice to be 
prosecuted; social sanctions, he argues, should be enough. The problem is that this suggestion, if put into 
practice, might create a terrible social climate of control and reproaches. 
15 G.A.  Cohen,  ‘Incentives,  Inequality,  and  Community’,  in:  St,  Darwall  (ed.),  Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner 
Lectures on Human Value (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 331-97, here: 380. 
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are not relevant for the guidance of individual actions.16 The principles and standards of 
personal morality are different from the principles of justice.17  Rawls’s  main  argument  for 
this separation is that otherwise implausible consequences and normative ambiguities would 
result. The obvious objection against monism is that the principles of justice apply, as in 
Rawls’s  theory,  merely  to  the  basic  structure  of  society,  i.e.,  the  political constitution, the 
system of property rules, and the family. The reply of Cohen is that if patterns of 
discrimination are persistent despite existing legal restrictions and regulations, the basic 
structure argument seems to lose its plausibility.     
 
A similar frustration with a basic structure-account of justice in the case of global inequality 
and world poverty motivates cosmopolitans to come close to monism, by putting more weight 
on individual duties and applying the principles of justice to individual choices. Interestingly 
enough, when it comes to the problem of world poverty, we find such a tendency toward 
monism in the work of authors who otherwise are critical of monism, such as Thomas Pogge. 
 
In the general debate between dualists and monists Pogge sides with dualism. Pogge rejects 
the view that the moral assessment of social institutions should depend on a comprehensive 
moral conception that also governs personal conduct. Principles of personal conduct should be 
distinguished from the principles of justice guiding the design of institutions18 According to 
Cohen, a social ethos would develop if the difference principle guided the choices of 
individuals as well. As an example of a specific moral climate created by a commitment to the 
difference  principle,  Cohen  cites  the  relatively  moderate  differences  between  managers’  and  
workers’  salaries  in  post-war Germany compared with the striking differences in incomes 
between managers and workers in the post-war US; Cohen attributes the lower income 
differentials between managers and workers in post-war Germany to the stronger social ethos 
in the German Wiederaufbau area.  
 
                                                          
16 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, New  York:  Columbia  University  Press1993:  “(T)he  principles  of  justice,  in  
particular the difference principle, apply to the main public principles and policies that regulate social and 
economic  inequalities.”  p.  282.     
17 In A Theory of Justice  Rawls  states:  “There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  principles  which  should  regulate  
an association of men is simply an extension of the principle  of  choice  for  one  man.  …(T)he  correct  regulative  
principle  for  anything  depends  on  the  nature  of  that  thing.”  Rawls,  A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, M.A.: The 
Belknap Press, 1999), p. 25. Rawls uses this passage to argue against utilitarianism; however, his remarks can be 
taken as a general warning to confound principles for the normative design of institutions with principles guiding 
personal choices. Compare also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, § 19, p. 98ff and § 51, p. 293ff.  
18 Pogge,  ‘On  the  Site  of  Distributive  Justice:  Reflections  on  Cohen  and  Murphy’,  Philosophy and Public Affairs 
29, 2 (2000), 137-69, esp. 139. 
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Pogge  considers  Cohen’s  hope  that  a  social  ethos  might  have  inequality-reducing effects as 
unrealistic. He objects that the lower income differentials in post-war Germany were simply a 
consequence of different tax laws: US tax laws allow higher salaries for managers.19 In 
opposition  to  Cohen’s  social  ethos  conception  Pogge  affirms  the  basic-structure argument and 
the regulative power of laws and institutional decrees.  
 
Pogge, moreover, rejects the idea of applying the difference principle to individual choices 
altogether. His critical argument is that an application of the difference principle to individual 
choices would require highly talented and efficient people, who might contribute substantially 
to the improvement of the situation of the worst off, to adopt jobs that they do not want to 
accept.20 Pogge’s  objection  amounts  to  saying  that  monism  entails  a  violation  of  a  basic  
principle  of  political  liberalism,  namely  the  right  to  choose  one’s form of life. However, in 
Pogge’s  work  on  world  poverty  the  principle  of  liberal  autonomy  seems  restricted  in  a  way  
which is open to his own objections against monism. 
 
An  interpretation  of  Rawls’s  theory  along  monistic  lines  clearly  results,  I  think,  in a nightmare 
of responsibilities and demands, if applied to the problem of global inequalities.  The 
difference principle, in particular, would make demands on persons that are highly 
implausible: persons in one country who are better off, maybe only slightly better off, than 
persons in another country would have to devote their moral strength to improving the 
situation of others. Therefore, persons slightly better off in China would have to do all they 
can to improve the situation of poor people in India who are worse off. But what if the people 
in India whom they helped were to experience an economic boom shortly afterwards and 
become much better off than the Chinese? The problematic consequence is not only an excess 
of responsibilities, but also an absurd game of giving and demanding on a piecemeal basis 
which does not reflect our common understanding of justice. 
  
The adoption of the difference principle as a guideline for individual behaviour would 
severely restrict the autonomy of individuals to develop and pursue their own plan of life. 
They would have to pursue life plans that contribute to an increase of social goods so that the 
situation of the worst off members of society can be improved. However, the right to choose 
one’s  form of life is a basic principle of a society which guarantees basic liberties. Autonomy 
                                                          




in the sense of having the (economic) means to pursue a plan of life is also considered by 
many cosmopolitans as the benchmark of a global conception of justice.21  
  
To conclude:  Monism seems an implausible position facing several objections:  
a. The way monism blurs the distinction between public and individual morality leads to 
implausible consequences.  
b. The adoption of the difference principle as a principle of personal choice results in unclear, 
but probably also excessively demanding, requirements and burdens. Exactly what contributes 
to the advantage of the worst off person? What do we have to do in order to promote the 
advantage of the worst off? 
c.  Strenghtening the moral requirements on the side of individuals might not have the desired 
effect – not because moral motivations are too weak or contingent as such, but because they 
might have no impact on underlying structures.22  
 
The strategy of putting more weight on personal duties also proves unhelpful in the case of 
global inequalities. Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency among cosmopolitans to pursue 
that line. Given the pressure of a severe problem like world poverty, many are tempted to 
discharge the moral burden in terms  of  strong  individual  moral  obligations.  Pogge’s  work  on  
world poverty is an example.    
 
3. GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INDIVUAL MORAL DUTIES  
 
In his book World Poverty and Human Rights Pogge combines cosmopolitanism with an 
institutional account: the primary moral units are individuals; institutional reforms, however, 
are the prior means of fighting global inequalities and world poverty. Severe poverty is a 
violation of basic human rights. Human rights, including social and economic rights, are the 
basic normative parameter for developing a just world-order. The main goal is not re-
distribution  on  a  global  level,  but  “an  economic  order  under  which  each  participant  would  be  
able  to  meet  her  basic  social  and  economic  needs“.23 The  normative  aim  of  Pogge’s  position  
is to guarantee all humans a life beyond marginalization, poverty, hunger and death due to 
                                                          
21 See e.g.  Martha  Nussbaum’s  position  in  M.C.  Nussbaum,  Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership, (Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2006), ch. 5.    
22 See  Dale  Jamieson,  ‘Duties  to  the  Distant:  Aid,  Assistance,  and  Interventions  in  the  Developing  World’,  The 
Journal of Ethics, 9 (2005), 151-70, for striking examples of problematic consequences of direct transfers of aid 
and assistance. 
23  Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 182.   
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malnutrition. The focus is on a threshold of a minimally decent life, not on re-distribution as 
such.24 
  
Pogge  develops  an  “institutionalist  interpretation”  of  human  rights  according  to  which  human  
rights are claims against those social orders that have the power of enforcing their regulations. 
Yet human rights also place demands in regard to personal choices and duties of citizens. If a 
social order does not meet its obligation to guarantee human rights, then individuals who 
profit from this system have a duty to engage in activities to reform it. As Pogge writes:  
 
The normative force of others’  human  rights  for  me  is  that  I  must  not  help  uphold  and 
 impose upon them coercive social institutions under which they do not have secure access 
 to the objects of their human rights. I would be violating this duty if, through my 
 participation, I helped sustain a social order in which such access is not secure, in which 
 blacks are enslaved, women disenfranchised, or servants mistreated, for example. Even if 
 I owned no slaves or employed no servants myself, I would still share responsibility: by 




Pogge considers two negative duties as crucial, namely, the duty not to violate and undermine 
just institutions, and the duty not to participate in the upholding of unjust institutions or to 
profit from them. Individuals do have a collective responsibility to ensure that the institutions 
they help sustain are just. If other persons die because of poverty, then this amounts to a 
violation of a negative duty, namely to respect the basic right to life and bodily integrity. To 
help poor people therefore cannot be a positive duty in the classical sense of a duty of 
beneficience or of assistance.  
 
The reason why Pogge postulates the duty towards poor people as a negative one is clearly to 
emphasize the moral urgency at stake. His argument seems to be: If we consider the duties 
towards poor people as positive duties, then the injustice suffered by the global poor would 
not receive the moral attention it deserves.  
  
Is  Pogge’s  move  to  impose  on  individuals  living  in  developed  countries  a  negative  duty  
towards people in poor countries convincing? Usually the distinction between negative and 
                                                          
24 The basic parameter of global justice are human rights, more so: economic rights. On the global level it is 
important  for  Pogge  „to  choose  or  design  the  economic  ground  rules  that  regulate  property,  cooperation,  and  
exchange and thereby condition production and cooperation“.  Pogge,  World Poverty and Human Rights, 182. 
Pogge  holds  that  this  offers  „a  standard  for  the  moral  assessment  of  alternative  feasible  schemes  of  economic  
institutions“  which  is  independent  of    „the  idea  of  already  owned  resources  to  be  re-distributed“.  Ibid. 
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positive duties is drawn in the following way: Negative duties are duties to refrain from doing 
something; positive duties are duties to do something: they involve positive action. On 
Pogge’s  account  of  negative  duties,  however,  the  distinction  between  active  and  passive  
collapses, since his negative duties do involve positive actions. The negative duty of 
individuals not to violate the human rights of people in poor countries by profiting from an 
unjust economic world order has to be discharged by certain positive actions, for example, by 
protesting against the unfair regime of international organizations, possibly also by moving to 
other  places  and  leaving  one’s  country.  As  Pogge  writes:   
 
 I might honor my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or an emigrant, but 
 I could honor it more plausibly by working with others toward shielding the victims of 
 injustice from the harms I help produce or, if this is possible, toward establishing secure 
 access through institutional reform.26  
 
 
Two  objections  come  to  mind.  First,  one  might  be  tempted  to  object  that  Pogge’s  position  
amounts to a confusion of negative and positive duties since negative duties are duties to 
refrain from doing something and not duties to take positive action. This criticism depends on 
the stringency of the active/passive distinction. However, this distinction is a notoriously 
fragile one. In specific circumstances, the negative duty not to endanger the life of others can 
be discharged only by a positive action: if someone is drowning, and we are in a position to 
help, we violate the negative duty towards the drowning person by not taking positive action. 
So the possible argument that Pogge mixes up negative and positive duties in an illegitimate 
way is not convincing. 
   
A second objection is more to the point. In his analysis of the moral claims posed by world 
poverty Pogge tries, as already pointed out, to avoid the consequences of reading positive 
duties as being weaker than negative duties.27 The way in which he spells out the claims of 
poor people apparently appeals only to negative duties. Pogge sees in the lack of help for poor 
people a much stronger violation of a duty than occurs when person has not fulfilled her 
positive duty of assistance or beneficence. In order to escape the classical problem that 
positive duties allegedly do not have the moral weight of negative duties, he tries to avoid the 
appeal to positive duties altogether. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 70. 
26 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 72. 
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Pogge is certainly right to complain that the moral weight of the problem of world poverty is 
not recognized adequately. Yet the urgency of the issue of world poverty can also be 
emphasized  if  the  classical  distinction  between  negative  and  positive  duties  remains.  In  Kant’s  
framework, for example, the moral strength of positive duties and negative duties is equal; 
positive duties are not weaker. Moreover, there is an important reason why Kant separated 
negative from positive duties, which we should take seriously. By ignoring this Kantian point, 
Pogge comes close to violating some fundamental liberal premises in regard to the scope of 
moral obligation. 
 
Kantian duties of justice are different from duties of virtue in the following respect: duties of 
virtue are directed towards ends, i.e., ends which the individual recognizes as right and 
appropriate according to practical reason. The ends are not set arbitrarily; they are 
normatively prescribed:  one’s  own  perfection  and  the  happiness  of  others.28 Duties of virtue 
are wide duties; duties of justice are strict or narrow duties. Duties of justice are of strict 
obligation because they demand or forbid a specific action. They are negative duties, so-called 
duties of omission (Unterlassungspflichten). A duty of omission can only be discharged by 
not doing a specific action.  
  
Duties of virtue, however, demand the realization of ends, whereby it is left to the judgement 
of the individual person in which way to fulfil these requirements. The reason why duties of 
virtue are classified as wide duties is that they express a broad moral obligation which need 
not be discharged by a specific action. The leeway in fulfilling positive duties of virtue is due 
to moral epistemology: Individuals are, given their knowledge of the particular situation and 
circumstances they are in, better judges about how best to fulfil their moral obligation than a 
universal law procedure that generalizes over cases could tell them.29 The moral law 
establishes the obligation as such, while determining the details of how to live up to it must be 
left to individual judgement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
27 This quite common  interpretation  is  often  (erroneously)  justified  by  referring  to  Kant’s  distinction  between  
perfect and imperfect duties.  
28 See I.  Kant,  ‘Introduction  to  the  Doctrine  of  Virtue’,  in:  Kant,  The Metaphysics of Morals. Part II: 
Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue, ed. by M. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 150, 151 (Academy edition: 6:387, 6:388). For  a  highly  insightful    discussion  of  Kant’s  account  of  virtues  
see  Ch.  M.  Korsgaard,  ‘An  Introduction  to  the  Ethical,  Political,  and  Religious  Thought  of  Kant’,  in:  Korsgaard, 
Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 18-22;;  cf.  also  Korsgaard,  ‘Kant’s  
Formula  of  Universal  Law’,  in:  Korsgaard,  Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 82-4. 




Positive duties differ from negative duties because the idea of universal moral legislation does 
not tell one in which way the normative obligation can and should be fulfilled in a specific 
context and situation. So the inevitable particularity of living up to such demands is the reason 
why  duties  of  beneficence  are  a  positive  duty,  i.e.,  an  imperfect  duty  in  Kant’s  terminology. 
The moral judgment of the person is necessary to determine in which form he or she can fulfil 
this obligation.  
 
The Kantian specification of negative and positive duties is highly relevant for assessing 
which duties the problem of global justice implies. To defend an account of global justice that 
allows for positive duties does not amount to a weakening of normative force. It merely 
means that the obligation to take measures against global poverty creates on the side of 
individuals an obligation to do something, though in which way individual persons fulfil this 
requirement is a matter of their personal moral judgement. This is the case because 
individuals do have the competence to decide in which form they can best discharge the 
general moral obligation, given the particular context they are situated in. A universal 
prescription of justice as it is given in the case of negative duties would restrict the 
individuals’  autonomy  in  pursuing  their  moral  ends.  The  political  conception  of  justice,  which 
distinguishes clearly between principles of justice and individual moral duties (including 
positive duties), grants that autonomy; but a version of cosmopolitanism like the one Pogge 
defends – which recognizes merely negative duties - limits this autonomy in a problematic 
way. 
 
Negative duties are duties of justice. They drastically limit the freedom of individuals to set 
their own ends. This is justified if basic rights of others, for example their right to life and 
bodily integrity, would be violated directly by specific actions of individuals. Pogge claims 
that persons who profit from an unjust social and economic order do have a negative duty to 
protect the victims of this unjust order and to work towards a reform of it. The question is: 
What kind of duty is the negative duty appealed to here? It is certainly not a duty of justice in 
a juridical sense. We do not imprison people in rich countries if they neglect their duty to 
work towards a reform of social institutions. Pogge concedes this point when he emphasizes 
that he promotes a version of a moral, not a legal cosmopolitanism. 
 
In the sphere of morality - and  global  justice  is  a  question  of  morality  on  Pogge’s  account  - 
there is no recourse to the use of force. It is, however, a characteristic of negative rights and 
  
14 
duties that there is strong reason to enforce them by state power. Positive duties cannot be 
enforced this way, at least not within a fairly liberal framework.   
 
If  people’s  individual  choices  in  developed  countries  were  normatively  determined by the 
Rawlsian principles of justice, at least by the difference principle, then their way of living 
would have to be organised around the aim and end of reducing serious economic inequality. 
This might result, as pointed out, in excessively high demands and requirements on the side of 
individual persons. Why should persons have the duty to give up their form of life and accept 
a rather arduous way of living? Do they really have a conclusive reason to regard their form 
of life as wrong, especially if they do not have a luxurious lifestyle and could not afford it 
anyway? This sceptical question becomes even more urgent because many individual efforts 
to eliminate global inequalities are undermined by structural factors and disastrous political 
developments. 
 
So  two  aspects  of  Pogge’s  account  seem  to  me  problematic.  First,  there  is  a  conceptual  
difficulty in the way he defines and uses the notion of a negative duty. The duties he 
postulates as negative ones amount structurally to positive duties. Second, Pogge’s  inadequate  
use and application of the notion of a negative duty has the consequence that his account 
entails excessive requirements on the side of individuals. 
 
People in economically well-off countries violate a negative duty, according to Pogge, by 
profiting from a social order that has unjust and harmful consequences for persons in other 
areas of the world. So they have a negative duty to protest against such an unjust economic 
order. However, individuals cannot be under an obligation to forego an action which they 
have not undertaken – namely to harm other persons directly by one of their actions. Though 
individuals  are  not  directly  responsible  for  global  inequality,  Pogge’s  account  subjects  them  to  
heavy burdens which, I think, are unjustified. 
 
Pogge’s  argument,  for  example,  requires  each  person  who  profits  from  the  currently  unjust  
global economic order to take action against the unjust practices of global institutions. Pogge 
emphasises that there are several possibilities to fulfil the negative duty of not doing harm to 
poor people in poor countries. However, the possibilities he offers - organising political 
action, protesting, and even emigrating to another country - are in their daily consequences 
harsh alternatives. Not everyone is in a situation that allows her to fight constantly against the 
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WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. Many people could not live their lives in such a context 
of permanent protest. Those who have to care for children or for elderly or sick people cannot 
fulfil this program. And the demand that one morally ought to emigrate to another country 
because  one’s  own  country  is  involved  in  possibly  harmful  practices  seems  absurd.   
 
One might argue that Pogge allows leeway for individuals in judging how they best live up to 
the obligation. This is correct: Pogge mentions that there are several ways to fulfil the 
negative duty of not doing harm. However, to argue this way just amounts to saying that the 
duties at stake are positive duties. The characteristic element of positive duties is, as I have 
pointed out, that they admit of a contextual interpretation whereas negative duties require 
refraining from a specific action.  
 
Pogge’s  construction  of  negative  duties  on  the  side  of  individuals  profiting  from  an  unjust  
economic order is implausible. A theory of global justice cannot require a negative duty on 
the side of individuals to engage in permanent resistance or civil disobedience against unjust 
international  organizations.  The  right  of  having  autonomy  in  choosing  one’s  plan  of  life is not 
compatible with a position that demands permanent political struggle against social and 
political orders, especially when their responsibility seems to be not always clearly given.30   
 
The  result  of  my  discussion  of  Pogge’s  position  is  that  we  should  be  careful  in  giving  up  the  
conceptual separation between principles of justice addressed to institutions and the moral 
duties of individuals. A monist account is, as I pointed out, not a satisfactory alternative. 
Therefore, a combination of the normative design of institutions with an account of the moral 
duties arising on the side of individuals is more promising. Such a normative conception 
would need to prescribe both the institutional measures to fight poverty and the individual 
moral duties that would further the effect of such institutional measures.  
 
Pogge in a way keeps to the separation between principles of justice guiding institutions and 
principles guiding individual choices, but in his account of negative duties he undermines it. 
In this respect the political conception of justice is more plausible as it distinguishes clearly 
between those normative principles which are guidelines for institutions and those principles 
which guide individual choices.  
                                                          
30 In which way can an unemployed factory worker whose previous employer transferred the production of the 




To  conclude:    A  main  feature  of  Pogge’s  account  is  his  rejection  of  the  classical  
understanding of duties to help other people as so-called positive duties.31 The idea is that an 
interpretation of our duties to poor people as positive duties amounts to a status quo 
justification rather than a remedy to the problem of world poverty. However, understanding 
positive duties as being weaker than negative duties – an assumption Pogge shares - depends, 
as  I  tried  to  show,  on  a  mistaken  reading  of  Kant’s  account  of  positive  duties.  A  political  
conception of justice need not be committed to the thesis that negative duties have more 
normative strength than positive duties. Once we concede that negative duties and positive 
duties have equal weight, one of the main objections Pogge raises against a political 
conception of justice looses force. 
 
But in another respect the political conception (at least some versions of it) is not convincing: 
its tendency to limit justice and accountability to state borders is indeed highly problematic. In 
the next section I will argue that this deficiency can be corrected without giving up the basic 
framework of a political conception of justice. 
 
4. GLOBAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
 
Recent political theory has questioned the legitimacy of the nation-state system. According to 
cosmopolitans, the nation-state is in many ways a hindrance to a just global normative order. 
National borders, so the criticism goes, are not compatible with a global moral outlook and 
the inclusion of all the members of the world society.32 Political and social rights— for 
example, citizenship, residency, and the right to work — are not granted universally; they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
country? Moreover, how can she be made collectively responsible for violating a negative duty, namely not to 
harm or kill other people? 
31  Pogge  criticizes,  for  example,  Rawls’s  classification  of  the  natural  duty  of  justice,  i.e.  the  duty  of  assistance,  
as a positive duty. Rawls, he argues, gives thereby our duty to help others in need insufficient normative weight. 
Ibid.,  140,  292  (n  211,  212).  This  criticism  of  Rawls  (which  depends  on  Rawls’  interpretation  of  positive  duties  
in A Theory of Justice) is  justified  as  far  as  Rawls’s  reading  of  individual  positive  duties  is  concerned. (Rawls 
assumes in A Theory of Justice that  individual  positive  duties  are  weaker  than  negative  duties.)    But  Pogge’s  
objection  does  not  touch  on  Rawls’s  position  as  he  outlines  it  in  The Law of Peoples. In the Law of Peoples 
Rawls claims that peoples do have a duty of assistance towards burdened societies. However, that duty of 
assistance  is  not  a  natural  or  ‘weak’  positive  duty;;  it  is  simply  a  normative  guideline  for  the  way  societies  ought  
to shape their international relations. Pogge confounds what Rawls says in regard to institutions and institutional 
policies with what Rawls says in regard to individual morality. 
32 Pogge argues that from the standpoint of cosmopolitan morality national sovereignty in its classical form is no 
longer defensible. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 126-51. Seyla Benhabib equally takes a critical 
stance towards the nation-state; she diagnoses a ‘disaggregation  of  citizenship’  as  a  consequence  of  migration  
and  a  dissociation  of  citizenship  and  cultural  identity.  See  Seyla  Benhabib,  ‘Democratic  Iterations.  The  Local,  
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granted to certain people, and the nation-state is the institution that has the authority to confer 
or withhold these privileges. This partiality nations-states show towards the well-being of 
their citizens does not sit well with the demand that all people have an equal moral standing 
and an equal right to moral consideration.  These quite familiar cosmopolitan arguments raise 
the question as to whether the nation-state is a precarious institution from the point of view of 
justice.  
 
A political conception of justice,  as  we  find  it  in  Rawls’s  work,  does  not  question  the  nation  
state order. Its main focus, namely, to formulate the principles and conditions of the just basic 
structure,  presupposes  implicitly  that  societies  are  organized  in  state  units.  Rawls’s  extension 
of his political conception to the international sphere in The Law of Peoples does not 
challenge the nation state system as such, either.  
 
Some defenders of a political conception of justice, however, have made a stronger claim, 
namely, that a state order is a necessary framework for social justice. One philosopher who 
has recently defended a political conception of justice along this line against a cosmopolitan 
reading of global justice is Thomas Nagel. He proposes a coercion-based version of political 
justice:  justice  has  to  be  backed  by  state  authority  and  requires  “government  as  an  enabling  
condition”.33 Nagel justifies this assumption with the connection between sovereignty and 
justice: 
 
What creates the link between justice and sovereignty is something common to a 
 wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend on the coordinated conduct of 
 large numbers of people, which cannot be achieved without law backed by a 
 monopoly of force.34  
 
Nagel’s  links  justice  to  the  state-structure because he assumes that justice can be realized only 
by state coercion. Accordingly he limits the scope of justice:  
 
The full standards of justice, though they can be known by moral reasoning, apply 
 only within the boundaries of a sovereign state, however arbitrary those boundaries 
 may be. Internationally, there may well be standards, but they do not merit the full 
 name of justice.35  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the  National,  and  the  Global’,  in  Another Cosmopolitanism, ed.by Robert Post with commentaries by Jeremy 
Waldron, Bonnie Honig and Will Kymlicka, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 45-80.   
33  Nagel,  ‘The  Problem  of  Global  Justice’,  114.   
34  Ibid., 115.  
35  Ibid., 122. 
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Nagel holds that justice refers to the basic institutions of society; justice cannot apply to 
individuals outside the realm of the nation-state.  Justice  is,  therefore,  an  “associative  
obligation”,  only  owed  to  those  with  whom  we  have  strong  political  relations. We do not have 
a full obligation to those with whom we have not yet established political relations within a 
sovereign nation-state which subdues us to its coercive power. We can speak of egalitarian 
justice regarding the internal structure of the nation-state, but absent a global coercive power 
(which for Nagel clearly is not in place) there can be no global justice – neither in the sense of 
individual relations between persons nor between global institutions.  
 
Nagel acknowledges, of course, the existence of institutions and organizations on a 
supranational level. He denies, however, that these new developments of global interaction do 
away with the significance and priority of the nation-state. International organisations are, as 
he points out, simply tools for establishing ways for nation-states  to  “cooperate  to  better  
advance  their  separate  aims”  and  he  adds  that  “they  rely  on  the  enforcement  of  the  power  of  
the  separate  sovereign  states,  and  not  on  a  supranational  force  that  is  responsible  to  all”.36 
 
Nagel’s  argument  goes  against  the  line  of  much  of  current  theorising,  especially  the  global  
horizon and global governance rhetoric we often encounter in this field.37 His standpoint 
looks stunningly conservative. The criticism  of  Nagel’s  coercion-based account has been 
sharp.38  However,  I  think  Nagel’s  account  offers,  aside  from  the  limited  way  Nagel  himself  
understands it, a normative standard for the assessment of international organizations and 
relations. 
 
A main objection against  Nagel’s  coercion-based political conception of justice has been that 
Nagel completely ignores the existence of coercion on the global level: force is not 
                                                          
36  Ibid., 140. 
37 For  a  good  criticism  of  that  rhetoric  cf.  Jean  Cohen,’Whose  Sovereignty?:  Empire  versus  International  Law’,  
in: Ch. Barry and Th. Pogge, (eds.), Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005), 159-89, here: 164-170. 
38 One  critic  has  argued  that  Nagel’s  coercion-based  political  theory  of  justice  “rests  on  a  perverse  normative  
principle”.  See  A.  Abizadeh,  ‘Cooperation,  Pervasive  Impact,  and  Coercion:  On  the  Scope  (not Site) of 
Distributive  Justice’,  351.  The  perverse  normative  premise  is  according  to  Abizadeh  Nagel’s  claim  that  demands  
of  justice  arise  only  if  a  person  is  subjected  to  state  coercion  “regulated  by  a  system  of  law  carried  out  in  her  
name, i.e. actively  engaging  her  will”.  (Ibid.,  351).  This  assumption  entails,  Abizadeh  criticises,  that  a  state  can  
avoid  accountability  in  terms  of  justice  “by  denying  to  those  whom  it  coerces  any  standing  as  putative  authors  of  
the  system  of  coercion”;;  a  consequence  which  seems  “perverse”  in  regard  to  the  force  states  enact  against  
foreigners and possible immigrants. (Ibid., 351) This criticism seems only justified if Nagel would hold that 
states can enact immigration regulations arbitrarily, without any need to account for them. Yet Nagel merely 
claims that states have the duty to enact those laws with an eye to the will and consent of the members of that 
state. One might criticize that such a conception inevitably leads to rather restrictive immigration laws, but the 
assumption as such certainly does not seem perverse.  
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exclusively an element of the nation-state structure. International organizations — for 
example, the IMF, the WTO — are coercive as well; agreement to their terms is not always 
voluntary.39 For example, states often have no choice but to comply with the regulations and 
policies of those organizations, and they often have no exit-option. Moreover, international 
organizations are, as critics point out, rule-generating bodies enacting norms and guidelines, 
and non-compliance with imposed trade and finance agreements entails often substantial 
sanctions. Transnational institutions have intergovernmental power since they have an impact 
on national decision-making  and  national  normative  standards.  So  Nagel’s  idea  that  states  join  
these organizations only to pursue their individual self-interests, and that they remain 
completely sovereign actors controlling the enforcement of regulations by their national 
enforcement power, underestimates completely the inevitable transformations on the national 
level. As Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel note:  
 
 In joining the WTO in order to participate as fully as possible in the global economy, 
 member states are not agreeing to substitute the domestic rules that they have settled on 
 with the universal laws of efficient commerce. Rather, they are agreeing to remake their 
 rules, in domain after domain, in light of the efforts, recorded in international standards 
 regimes, of all the others to reconcile distinctive domestic regulations with general 
 standards that are also attentive to the interests of others elsewhere.40  
 
Some critics take this line of objection, pointing out the existence of coercion on the global 
level,  to  be  sufficient  to  reject  Nagel’s  coercion-based account.41 But such a complete 
dismissal  of  Nagel’s  coercion-based  account  seems  too  quick.  Nagel’s  argument,  though  he  
himself does not pursue that line, can be extended to the international sphere and can be 
interpreted as providing a quite useful normative guideline for interactions on the global level. 
 
                                                          
39 For a discussion of the no-choice situation of poor countries against IMF policies see J.E. Stiglitz, Globlization 
and its Discontents, (New York, London: Norton & Company, 2002), Ch. 2 and 3.  
40 Joshua  Cohen  and  Ch.  Sabel,  ‘Extra  Republicam.  Nulla  Justitia?’  Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34, 2 (2006), 
147-75, here: 172. 
41 One  example  is  A.  Sangiovanni,  ‘Global  Justice,  Reciprocity,  and  the  State’,  Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
35, 1 (2007), 3-39. Sangiovanni defends a relation-based version of a political conception of justice: states 
provide basic collective goods; for example, protection from physical attack and maintenance of a system of 
property rights; therefore we have special obligations of egalitarian justice to fellow citizens and residents who 
support  the  system  providing  these  goods.  Sangiovanni’s  relation-based account seems to me not so different 
from a coercion-based version of the political conception; the distinction he draws up between the two positions 
seems  artificial.  The  decisive  point  in  Sangiovanni’s  defense  of  a  relation-based political conception of justice 
can only be that the state provides secure access to certain goods that others living in this community contribute 
to create. The production of collective goods within a state-community, however, does not work exclusively on 
the basis of voluntary commitment, but includes enforcement. So a coercion-based account is at the basis of a 
relation-based version of the political conception.  
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Nagel’s  thesis  about  the  connection  between  sovereignty  and  coercion  entails  that  the  state  
has a specific responsibility towards those persons who are subject to its coercive power: the 
state owes its subjects a justification for the way they are treated. As Nagel writes:   
 
A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual advantage. The societal 
 rules determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary 
 association. I submit that it is this complex fact – that we are both putative joint authors 
 of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e. expected to accept their 
 authority even when the collective decision diverges from our personal preferences 
that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the 
system.42  
 
Nagel emphasizes that most people have no choice in that respect. But their being members of 
a  political  society  is  connected  with  “a  special  involvement  of  agency  or  the  will”:  they  have  
the dual role of being subject to authority but also - ideally- giving their consent to the 
exercise  of  authority  qua  “participants  in  the  general  will”.43 
 
What Nagel formulates here is not merely an empirical premise about the connection between 
justice and coercion but a normative standard of when coercion is legitimate. Coercion is 
justified if those who are subject to it could give their consent. Understood in this way, 
Nagel’s  coercion-based account has the potential for a normative standard in the international 
sphere. Are the terms on which states enter international organizations and treaties fair 
enough for them to give their consent? Are the agreements fair? Is their accountability and 
justification given towards those who are subject to sanctions if they do not comply with the 
agreements and rules?     
 
The  problem  with  Nagel’s  account  is  that  he  restricts  coercion  and  therefore  justice  to  the  
sovereign  state.  Cohen  and  Sabel  rightly  criticise  Nagel  for  making  no  room  for  “normatively  
motivated worries about whether global institutions are fair, or accountable and relatively 
transparent, or democratic, or about how to structure greater participation or representation in 
their  decision  making”.44 That ignorance is not a necessary presupposition of a coercion-based 
account;;  it  is  rather  due  to  Nagel’s  specifically  limited  reading  of  such  a  position.  There  
seems to be no need to understand the connection between justice and coercion in such a 
narrow  sense.  Nagel’s  version  of  a  political  conception  of  justice  associates  ‘justice’  mainly  
                                                          
42 Nagel,  ‘The  Problem  of  Global  Justice’,  128,  129.   
43 Ibid., 128. 
44 Cohen  and  Sabel,  ‘Extra  Republicam.  Nulla  Justitia?’,  156. 
  
21 
with its realization in the policies, institutional regulations, and the legislation of a nation-
state. Justice is connected with state coercion and is bound to the law backed by a state order. 
However, a political conception of justice allows us to understand the concept of justice in a 
wider sense. Standards of justice like reciprocity and fair equality of opportunity are then 
principles of public morality: they are guidelines not only for the design of nation-state 
institutions but also for the normative and moral assessment of institutions that we create on 
the global level.45  
 
Nagel, we can conclude, is wrong about the site as well as the scope of justice. Issues of 
justice are not confined to the basic structure of nation-states but arise also in regard to the 
evolving global basic structure, i.e., those international organizations which do have 
substantial impact on the social and economic conditions in various countries. International 
institutions are powerful norm-generating bodies that equally must meet standards of justice, 
fairness, and accountability.46  
 
Yet  extending  the  limits  of  Nagel’s  account  in  that  way  does  not  mean  that  we  have  reason  to  
do away with the institution of the nation-state as such. There are several arguments why 
there is no need to reject the nation-system in order to reach more justice on the global level. 
A first argument appeals to the structural advantages of the nation-state. Nation-states are 
established orders. They are sometimes the result of a long history and difficult struggles. 
They have a stabilizing function and their eruption or dissolution might come at a high cost. 
Nation-states are not necessarily bad actors and, especially if they incorporate a democratic 
                                                          
45 Nagel’s  worry  seems  to  be  that  including  problems  of  global  inequality  among  problems  of  justice  would  
make it possible to legally coerce individuals who are better off to help those worse-off. And that might be 
objectionable. However, such a consequence might be objectionable also from the point of view of a political 
conception of justice that recognizes problems of global justice and the existence of a global basic structure.  
46 One might argue that the concept of legitimacy which is weaker than the standard of justice might be more apt 
to  assess  the  policies  of  international  organizations.  For  such  a  proposal  see  F.  Peter,  ‘Global  Justice  and  
Legitimacy’,  Paper  presented  at the "Absolute Poverty and Global Justice" conference, Erfurt, July 18 - 20, 
2008.  
An  additional  problem  of  Nagel’s  account  seems  to  be  that  he  presupposes  also  a  quite  restricted  conception  of  
legitimacy.  See  Nagel,  ‘The  Problem  of  Global  Justice’,  140,  145.  Nagel  sees  human  rights  as  a  part  of  a  
minimal humanitarian morality outside the realm of justice. This does not sit well with the standing that human 
rights as a convention of international law actually possess. Human rights are the standard by which legal orders 
but also institutional structures and the work of international organizations are assessed. Human rights are 
connected with the idea of legitimacy in an important way. Human rights are, as Habermas puts it, a necessary 
component  of  the  concept  of  legitimacy,  because  human  rights  “ground  an  inherently  legitimate  rule  of  law”.  J.  
Habermas,  ‘Remarks  on  Legitimation  through  Human  Rights’,  in  Habermas,  The Postnational Constellation. 
Political Essays, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 113-29. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship 
between legitimacy and human rights see also A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral 
Foundations for International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 3, 5, 6. 
  
22 
order and system, they are a basis for culture and identity.47 To break up such orders might be 
politically risky and might create less protection in terms of security, guarantees, and rights.  
 
A second argument is that there is simply no moral duty for an enlargement of state-borders 
or an elimination of such borders. The requirement for global justice cannot entail the 
dissolution of the nation-state to be obligatory, since this dissolution does not necessarily lead 
to more justice. Extensions of state borders often create new injustices.48 Greater economic 
equality,  as  Rawls’s  important  axiom  of  lexical  priority  reminds  us,  might  not  be  a  justifying  
reason to upset existing normative orders, especially if these orders grant basic political rights 
on  the  basis  of  an  ‘equal  freedom’  standard.       
 
A third argument is that the idea of nation-states as autonomous political entities freely 
consenting to the policies of international organizations - organizations set up as tools for 
international cooperation, coordination, and a better global order - is a powerful normative 
criterion to assess the legitimacy of these global institutions. Certain nation-states, as has 
often been pointed out, are in such a weak political and economic position that they cannot 
display their sovereignty and autonomy in international negotiations and agreements. 
Therefore the way to go, it seems, is to confirm and secure their equal status and not take an 
additional step to undermine their autonomy by demanding their diaggregation and 
dissolution. The idea of equal sovereignty, as Jean Cohen argues, is a criterion for a rule of 
law regime on the gobal level:  
 
The concept of sovereignty is a reminder not only of the political context of law but also 
 of the ultimate dependence of political power and political regimes on a valid, public, 
 normative legal order for their authority.49  
 
 
Should we really be so impressed by the idea of global governance that we would think its 
emerging possibility gives us a decisive reason to prefer it to the traditional form of state-
                                                          
47 There is a justification of the nation-state on the grounds of culture and identity. That is not the approach I put 
forward here. One can provide a neutral justification of the nation-state that does not rely on cultural arguments, 
which somehow create problems of exclusion. For a justification of the nation-state on the basis of cultural and 
national identity see D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) and Citizenship and National 
Identity (Cambridge: Politiy Press, 2000).   
48 There  has  been,  for  example,  serious  criticism  in  the  Maghreb  countries  (based  on  appeals  to  ‘equal 
consideration’)  that  the  EU  integration  of  Eastern  European  countries  will  diminish  the  EU  support  for  structural  
reforms in North Africa. See  R.  Chennoufi,‘Kulturelle  Differenz.  Toleranz  und  Demokratie’,  in:  P.  Koller  (ed.),  
Die Globale Frage. Empirische Befunde und ethische Herausforderungen (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2006), 401-
17.  
49 Jean  Cohen,  ‘Whose  Sovereignty?:  Empire  versus  International  Law’,  173. 
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government? Would it bring more justice? The fancy and flattering way with which global 
governance is sometimes advocated should not deceive us about the possible lack of control, 
transparency, or legitimacy in the decision-making processes of transnational institutions. 
Certainly, I do not want to raise objections against the existence of these international 
organisations per se. I also do not want to claim that nation-states as such are always 
legitimate. However, what I would like to argue is that a strong condition for the political 
legitimacy of transnational institutions is the free and voluntary agreement of the nation-states 
that created these institutions by consent. International organisations are accountable to states 
and their citizens.50  
 
Institutions to promote justice are, as Hume tells us, artificial virtues, they are tools we invent 
and construct to help secure our well-being. And Hume adds that concern with the well-being 
of  those  affected,  “a  sympathy  with public interest”,  as  he  phrases  it,  “is the source of the 
moral approbation, which attends that virtue”  of  justice.51  Considered that way, some of the 
controversies between cosmopolitans and philosophers defending a political theory of justice 
– for example, the question whether individuals or institutions should be the relevant moral 












                                                          
50 For an explanation of accountability from the perspective of a global governance account see A..-M. 
Slaughter, A New World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 231-235.  
51 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition with text revised and notes by 
P.H. Nidditch, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), 499, 500. 
